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"WHAT DO WE DO NOW?": HELPING JURIES
APPLY THE INSTRUCTIONS
Christopher N. May*
"That you be a light to the jurors to open their eyes, but not a
guide to lead them by the nose."I
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past six years, I served as a juror in two cases, one
criminal2 and the other civil.3 These experiences suggest that juries
often confront the serious problem of not knowing what to do with
the law they are given. Neither jury I sat on was sure of how to use or
access the instructions. To my surprise they did not realize that each
of the claims or offenses contained in the charge consisted of a series
of elements. It was not obvious to them that in order to reach a ver-
* James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los Ange-
les. I wish to thank David Burcham, Joseph Charney, Allan Ides, Lary Lawrence, and
Laurie Levenson for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay.
1. Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment
on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161,
163 (1988) (quoting Francis Bacon (instructing judge about to assume duties)).
2. The case was tried in the California Superior Court in 1989. It arose out of an
incident at a small shopping plaza where a customer parked her car so as to block a park-
ing space designated for handicapped drivers. The customer refused requests by security
guards that she move her vehicle; during the three hours she was illegally parked, she also
repeatedly activated her car alarm. After the plaza owner finally called the police, the
customer attempted to drive off the premises. Security guards blocked her exit, and the
plaza owner then broke the side window of her car with a hammer and removed the keys
from the ignition. In the altercation the customer suffered an injury to her mouth. The
plaza owner was charged with two felonies: assault with intent to inflict severe bodily
harm, and false imprisonment. After a one-week trial, the 12-member jury acquitted the
defendant of both counts.
3. The case was filed in the California Superior Court by an engineer against a large
hospital for which he had worked as an independent researcher. Under an agreement with
the hospital, the plaintiff was to develop an invention; any royalties from the invention,
were it completed and patented, would be shared equally by the parties. In the fourth year
of the project, when the invention remained uncompleted, the hospital remodeled the area
where the plaintiff's laboratory space was located, and everything in the space was dis-
carded. The plaintiff sued the hospital for $9 million, asserting five claims for relief:
breach of contract; breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; bailment; and
both intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. The
trial in the summer of 1994 lasted about one month. The 12-member jury awarded the
plaintiff $167,000.
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dict it was necessary to go through each claim or offense and deter-
mine whether each one of the elements had been satisfied. Moreover,
there were times when the jury was unable to relate the facts to the
law in the sense of knowing which evidence was to be matched with
which legal element.
Upon reflection my surprise was unjustified. What it comes down
to is that these juries did not know how to apply the law to the facts. I
have been teaching law for more than twenty years; the problem that
these juries faced is identical to that which confounds most law stu-
dents-sometimes well into the second year. Lay jurors, who have
received no more than an hour or two of legal instruction, cannot be
expected to perform better than those who have studied diligently for
months. It is all too easy for those of us who are lawyers or judges to
forget what the world looked like before we entered law school. Mark
Twain observed that once he had become trained as a skilled river
pilot, he could no longer see the Mississippi in the way that he had as
a boy.4 The same phenomenon may hold for those of us who have
been trained in the law. We must try to recapture our innocence if we
are to make the jury's task a meaningful one.
To help rectify this situation, I offer two suggestions. First, in
charging the jury at the end of a case, the judge should include an
instruction that encourages the jury to break each claim or offense
down into its component elements, to deal with the elements one at a
time, and to ask whether the evidence established each element. Sec-
ond, in jurisdictions where the court is permitted to summarize the
evidence,5 the judge should either weave the evidence into the instruc-
tions, or use the threat of doing so to induce counsel to link the evi-
dence to the law in their closing arguments.
The thoughts put forward here stem from a very narrow eviden-
tiary base. At the same time, my experience appears not to have been
atypical, for it is mirrored in, and confirmed by, many published stud-
ies concerning jury behavior.6 Nevertheless, I acknowledge that the
suggestions made here are based on little more than a hunch.
Whether they will help juries in the future remains to be seen.7 In
4. See LEo MARX, THE MACHINE IN Ti GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PAS-
TORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA 321-25 (1964) (discussing this observation in Twain's works).
5. ROBERT G. NiELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A
MODERN MOVEMENT TO IPROvE THE JURY SYSTEM 31-33 (1979) (noting that judges are
permitted to summarize evidence in 40 states and in federal courts).
6. See infra part 1H.
7. See MARTIN GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 2-4 (1984), quoted in MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT & THOMAs D. RowE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PER.
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short, I present them without claiming to have discovered the First
Law of Jurydynamics.8
II. THE PROBLEM OF COMPREHENDING THE LAW
In the typical case 9 the jury has three distinct tasks. First, it must
examine the evidence and resolve disputed issues of fact; that is, it
must figure out what actually happened in the case. Then it must ex-
amine the judge's instructions to determine what the applicable law is.
Finally, it must apply the law to the facts in order to reach a verdict.10
A jury's failure to understand the evidence, to comprehend the law, or
to apply the law correctly may result in a miscarriage of justice or in
the verdict being overturned by the trial or appellate courts.
Much has been written about how to assist jurors to better pro-
cess and comprehend evidentiary material, including complex statisti-
cal evidence and expert testimony." Studies indicate that juries
generally do a good job of determining the facts.' 2 From an eviden-
sPEcrrvps 17 (1993) ("The process of scientific discovery often involves hunches, intuitions
and flashes of insight.... [W]hat characterizes the process as science is... the attempt to
subject the hunch, formulated as a hypothesis, to verification by carefully controlled
experiment.").
8. For an article of equally modest proportions but grotesquely dissimilar pretensions,
see Paul Horowitz et al., The Law of Prime Numbers, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 185, 190 (1993)
(claiming that its less-than-20 pages "may well be one of the most intelligent contributions
to legal scholarship in many years").
9. Where the jury is required to return a special verdict, its tasks are much narrower.
See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
10. Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 60-61,64 n.25b (2d Cir.) (Frank,
J.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1948); see also REm HASTm ET AL., INSIDE THM JURY 22-23,
169, 234 (Reid Hastie ed., 1983) (noting that juries commonly approach their task by first
looking at evidence to determine "what happened," then looking to judge's instructions to
determine what rules are, and finally applying law to facts to reach verdict). The jury's
third task of applying the law consists of two distinct steps: first, applying the law to the
facts to reach a specific legal conclusion-for example, Was the defendant negligent? Did
the defendant act with the intent to cause severe bodily harm?; and second, integrating
these conclusions into a verdict-for example, Is the plaintiff entitled to recover? Is the
defendant guilty? See Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or
in Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 163, 176 (1977).
11. See SAUL M. Kassn & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHrSMAN, THE AmRICAN JURY ON
TRIAIZ PSYCHOLOGICAL PERspECrrvEs 119-39 (1988); Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 68 (1981) [hereinafter
Lempert, Let's Not Rush]; Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock
After Twelve Years, in VERDIC. ASSESING T=n CWvM JURY SYSTEM 181-235 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993) [hereinafter Lempert, Taking Stock]; Daniel H. Margolis et al., Jury Com-
prehension in Complex Cases, 1990 A.B.A. SEc. LrIG. 24-43, 608-10.
12. HAsTI E- AL., supra note 10, at 230; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Bet-
ter Than One?, LAw & CoNrEMa,. PROBS., Aug. 1989, at 205, 217-18, 223.
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tiary standpoint, it appears that there are few cases which, if handled
properly, are beyond a jury's capacity to decide.13
Studies literally abound demonstrating the extent to which jurors
misapprehend the relevant law.14 The problem is especially severe
when the law is set forth in pattern instructions that-because they
are designed without the facts of any particular case in mind-tend to
be abstract, general, and technical.' s
Jury misunderstanding of the law may lead to arbitrary and liter-
ally lawless verdicts.' 6 This is quite distinct from the phenomenon of
jury nullification. Nullification is based on a jury's knowing and delib-
erate refusal to apply the law because it is contrary to the commu-
nity's sense of justice, morality, or fairness.' 7 If a jury does not
13. Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11, at 106-32; Lempert, Taking Stock, supra
note 11, at 181-235. But see Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 527-31 (finding that jurors in
lengthy federal trade secrets suit involving complex chemical processes "had a great deal of
difficulty deciding the facts of this case. They were stymied by both the complexity and
volume of the evidence"; but suggesting that if trial had been shorter and exhibits fewer,
jury might have been less confused).
14. Amr AM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCrIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 8-9,
12-17, 43-69 (1982); HAsTE ET AL., supra note 10, at 80-81 (finding that individual jurors
tested "less than 30 percent accurate on questions about material stated directly in the
judge's final charge, such as the elements of the legal definition of second degree murder");
KASSiN & WRIGn-smAN, supra note 11, at 148-56; NIELAND, supra note 5, at 23-27;
Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of Changes in
Composition and Procedures, in VERDICTI ASSESSING Tm CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra
note 11, at 414,422-23, 436,444-45; Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expecta-
tions and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICC. ASSESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 282, 295; Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instruc-
tions, in MH PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 280, 283-85 (Saul M.
Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Lempert, Taking Stock, supra note 11, at
151-52, 201-02; Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 43-49, 610-13; ide at 470-71, 516, 531-34
(noting that in complex federal trade secrets case in which judge based his charge on state
pattern jury instructions, individual jurors believed they understood law well but were un-
able to paraphrase many terms used in instructions); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and
Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REv. 71, 79-80 (1990) (summarizing studies);
Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV.
37, 41-44 (1993) (summarizing studies).
15. NIELAND, supra note 5, at 39; STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 112 (Ad-
visory Comm. on the Criminal Trial, Am. Bar Ass'n 1968).
16. HAsTm ET AL., supra note 10, at 80-81 (finding that 43% of mock juries studied in
comprehensive experiment based on actual trial reached "incorrect" verdicts in sense that
they departed from what experts agreed was correct verdict).
17. See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING TH JURY 149-63 (1986);
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, TiE AMERICAN JURY 221-347 (1966); KASSIN &
WRIOH MAN, supra note 11, at 156-62; Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making
Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 781 (1979); Alan Scheflin & Jon
Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of the Controversy, LAW & CoNMPi. PROnS.,
Aug. 1980, at 51. Nullification can occur in criminal cases. See, eg., CHRISTOPHER N.
MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REvIW AND Tm WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at
[Vol. 28:869
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understand the law, however, nullification cannot occur.18 Because
jury misapprehension of the law is not a ground for reversal,' 9 it is
important to do everything we can to help maximize jury comprehen-
sion. Otherwise, it is pointless and even hypocritical to go through the
ritual of instructing juries.
In addition to producing arbitrary and lawless verdicts, jury mis-
understanding of the law may be highly inefficient. If a jury has no
clear standards to guide it, its members may have difficulty reaching
the required degree of unanimity, resulting in a hung jury. Alterna-
tively, the verdict that the jury does reach may be so clearly erroneous
that the court will set it aside on a motion for judgment n.o.v. or a new
trial.2 0 If this occurs, not only will the time and resources devoted to
the trial have been totally wasted, but it may also spawn an equally
expensive and possibly futile second trial.
There have been many suggestions as to how to deal with the
jury's difficulty in comprehending the law. One solution would be to
entirely relieve the jury of any role in applying the law to the facts.
The jury would then never need to hear, much less understand, the
law that governs the case. There are two ways this might be done,
both applicable only in civil cases. First, the courts might create a
"complex cases" exception to the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial.2 ' However, the Supreme Court has not recognized such an ex-
ception, and the case for doing so appears not to have been made.'
85, 184-86 (1989) (noting jury refusals to convict under wartime laws that government
sought to enforce after 1918 armistice). Nullification can also occur in civil cases. See
HANS & V~mMAI, supra, at 160-63; Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11, at 80-84.
18. ELwoRK ET AL., supra note 14, at 3-5; Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11, at
86. There may be times when the jury's role as a reflector of society's values comes into
play not by choosing to ignore the law, but by resolving conflicts in societal values the
resolution of which is not clearly articulated by the law. See George L. Priest, Justifying the
Jury, in VE RIcr: AssESSnG Trim Civm JURY SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 106-18.
19. KAsSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 151-52; Tanford, supra note 14, at 102;
Tiersma, supra note 14, at 55-59.
20. See Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11, at 87-88, 92, 126-30.
21. Casper, supra note 14, at 426-27; Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11; Lempert,
Taking Stock, supra note 11; Tiersma, supra note 14, at 45-46 & n.37. The Seventh
Amendment has not been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90 (1875). However, a state might make such an exception to a jury trial right conferred by
state law.
22. Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11, at 129-32; Lempert, Taking Stock, supra
note 11, at 235.
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A second option would be to have civil juries return a special
verdict that resolves only the disputed questions of fact.23 The court
would then apply the law to the facts as found by the jury. While this
procedure is recognized in most jurisdictions,24 special verdicts do not
entirely eliminate the need for the jury to understand and apply the
law. Even with a special verdict, the jury must often decide issues of
"ultimate fact" such as negligence and causation, which entail difficult
legal instructions.2 Moreover, the special verdict is highly controver-
sial, often provoking sharp resistance,26 for it exposes a fundamental
ambivalence in our perception of the jury's role.27 On the one hand,
we insist that the jury apply the law as given it by the judge. Except in
a few states,28 the jury does not have the right to ignore the law. On
the other hand, we acknowledge that because a jury reflects the con-
science of the community, it has the power to nullify the law if justice,
morality, or common sense so dictate.29 This nullification function is
all but lost when a special verdict is employed.30 Lawyers, recognizing
that juries may in fact ignore or at least take the rough edges off the
23. This solution was urged by Judge Jerome Frank, who argued that with a general
verdict, we never know whether the jury correctly performed any of the steps necessary to
reach a verdict. Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54,60-61,64 n.25b (2d Cir.)
(Frank, J.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1948). Judge Frank hoped that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would be amended "to make compulsory either special verdicts or written
interrogatories in civil jury cases." Id. at 67. In the same case, Judge Learned Hand stated
that "it would be desirable to take special verdicts more often." Id. at 70 (Hand, J., con-
curring); see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALrY IN AMERICAN JUS-
TICE 141-42 (1949); see also Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 235, 328-29 (indicating that
special verdict form was used in federal civil antitrust action because judge believed it
would serve as road map for jury in its deliberation). But see Casper, supra note 14, at 433-
44 (noting problems with use of special verdicts).
24. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 49; CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 625 (West 1976); JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 533 (2d ed. 1993).
25. See JoHN F. WELLS & LisE A. PEARLMAN, CALiFoRNIA FoRms OF JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS § 1.03[7] (1994); Casper, supra note 14, at 436; Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 213,
228, 242-43, 293-329 (reporting that in federal civil antitrust case where jury was given
special verdict form consisting of five questions, instructions were 32 pages long, took one
hour to deliver, and contained multiple definitions of conspiracy).
26. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in VER-
DiCr. ASSESSING T=E CrvIL JURy SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 341, 360-61.
27. KAssIN & WmIGHsMAN, supra note 11, at 215.
28. Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland recognize that juries have the right to decide both
the law and the facts, though only in the latter two states is the jury expressly instructed
that it has this right. Scheffin & Van Dyke, supra note 17, at 79-85.
29. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
30. On the use of special verdicts and general verdicts with interrogatories, see FLEM.
ING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 377-81 (4th ed. 1992); FRmDENTHAL ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 533-34; Casper, supra note 14, at 440, 449-52.
[Vol. 28:869
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law, frequently oppose the use of a special verdict, for they do not
always want a case to be decided on the strict letter of the law.
31
These extreme solutions are rarely pressed. More often, jury con-
fusion about the law is addressed through a variety of mechanical and
procedural innovations which are designed to increase the level of ju-
ror comprehension. These include such devices as giving substantive
pretrial instructions;32 repeating the instructions;33 allowing jurors to
take notes on the judge's instructions;' giving the jury a written copy
or copies of the instructions;35 and having the judge answer jurors'
questions about the instructions.36 Many of these innovations have
been implemented at the state and federal levels. 7 Another option is
to employ a general verdict with interrogatories. Here, the jury is
asked to return a general verdict, but is also asked to answer specific
questions which may force it to take the steps necessary to correctly
reach a verdict.3 8 This is beneficial to the extent that it focuses jurors'
attention on key legal issues.39 However, it may be wasteful if, due to
inconsistent responses, the verdict is later overturned.40
31. See Casper, supra note 14, at 437-38 (noting "plausible a priori theorizing" that
special verdicts may, in close cases, favor defendant, but noting that others see possible
bias for plaintiff); Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 214,222 (noting that plaintiffs in federal
antitrust action opposed court's use of special verdict form, "believing that it put the plain-
tiff at a disadvantage because 'if the jury wants to go home early, they answer the first
question no, and they can go home'" (quoting plaintiff's attorneys); jury answered first
question as plaintiff's counsel had feared).
32. ELwoRK Er AL., supra note 14, at 21-24; NiELAND, supra note 5, at 32-34; Tanford,
supra note 14, at 83-84; Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 49-50, 614-17.
33. See Tanford, supra note 14, at 84-85.
34. NIELAND, supra note 5, at 30-31; Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 604.
35. ELWORK ET AL., supra note 14, at 18-20; NmLAND, supra note 5, at 28-30; Margolis
et al., supra note 11, at 51, 622-24; see CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 612.5 (West 1976) (stating
that court must advise jury that written copy of instructions is available and give jury copy
upon request). In California Superior Courts, some judges give each juror a written set of
instructions. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Frederick J. Lower, Jr., Judge, Los
Angeles County Superior Court (Dec. 20, 1994).
36. Lempert, Taking Stock, supra note 11, at 228; Margolis'et al., supra note 11, at 52-
53.
37. Tanford, supra note 14, at 93-94.
38. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 625 (providing for general
verdict with special findings of fact); FRmEDENTHAL Er AL., supra note 24, at 533-39; JAMES
Er AL., supra note 30, at 378-81.
39. JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, at 381; Casper, supra note 14, at 434-37; Margolis et
al., supra note 11, at 624.
40. See FED. R. Crv. P. 49(b) ("When the answers are inconsistent with each other and
one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be en-
tered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or shall order a new trial."); Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 624; id. at 128-29 (reporting
that federal judge in sexual harassment case rejected use of special verdict and special
Ap il 1995]
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Another approach to improving juror comprehension of the law
is to change the way judges speak to juries when giving them instruc-
tions. There is a considerable body of social science evidence showing
that rewriting and simplifying the language of jury instructions signifi-
cantly increases jurors' understanding of the law.4' However, courts
have generally been slow in responding to the findings of social sci-
ence research;42 this is particularly true with respect to revising pat-
tern jury instructions.43 Judges are often reluctant to depart from the
approved pattern instructions for fear that they will be reversed.44
Yet, even if the response were much better, a serious problem
would remain. Studies show that even when using revised and simpli-
fied instructions, jurors understand no more than eighty percent of the
law and usually far less.45 This may indicate that there is a limit to
interrogatories for fear that attorneys might claim there had been inconsistent verdicts
which could then lead to mistrial); id. at 457-58, 471 (reporting that federal judge in com-
plex trade secrets case rejected cross-defendant's request for use of special interrogatories
in order to prevent possible mistrial). But see JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, at 380 (noting
that general verdicts with interrogatories allow errors to be isolated and perhaps found to
be harmless, thereby reducing necessity for reversal on appeal).
41. See ELwoRK ET AL., supra note 14, at 12-17, 43-69; NIELAND, supra note 5, at 24-
27; Elwork et al., supra note 10, at 170-71, 175-78; Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 45;
Tanford, supra note 14, at 80-82.
42. On the problem in general, see J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Leg-
islatures, and Commissions Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 155 (1991).
43. KAssiN & WR JGTsMAN, supra note 11, at 152-53; NmLAND, supra note 5, at 22-27;
Elwork et al., supra note 10, at 164; Joseph Kimble, Plain English: A Charter for Clear
Writing, 9 CooLEY L. R.Ev. 1, 39-40 (1992); Lempert, Taking Stock, supra note 11, at 201,
244 n.98; Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 539, 541-42 (1992); Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 355-56; Tanford,
supra note 14, at 91-93; Tiersma, supra note 14, at 52-62. In one federal criminal case
where pattern instructions were used, the jury itself tried to rewrite the instructions using
lay terminology. Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 377, 397.
44. Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 355-56; Weinstein, supra note 1, at 162.
45. ELwoRK ET AT., supra note 14, at 64-69 (reporting study in which mock jurors
deliberating with standard instructions had 40% comprehension of the law, while those
using revised instructions had 78% comprehension); NMELAND, supra note 5, at 26 & nn.44-
45 (1979) (noting Arizona study where juror comprehension of standard pattern instruc-
tions was 52.06%, while with revised instructions their comprehension showed "a 20%
improvement"-that is, jurors understood 62% of revised instructions); Robert P. Char-
row & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 CoLuM. L. REv. 1306, 1333, 1370 (1979) (reporting study in
which mock jurors who were read pattern California jury instructions had comprehension
level of 44.7%, while their understanding of modified instructions was 59.2%); Elwork et
al., supra note 10, at 170, 175 (reporting two experiments in which mock jurors using stan-
dard Michigan instructions involving simple automobile negligence case had comprehen-
sion rates of 60% and 62%, while jurors given rewritten instructions had comprehension
rates of 81% and 71%; in neither case did mock jurors discuss instructions among them-
[Vol. 28:869
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how coherent the law can be made for lay persons.46 In addition,
however, the seeming inability of jurors to comprehend the law may
also reflect the fact that juries often have no idea how to use the in-
structions. They therefore spend little time reviewing them, and con-
sequently they may score poorly on recall and paraphrase tests
regardless of how clearly the instructions were written.
IL. THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING THE INSTRUCtiONS
Even if it were possible for juries to understand the evidence and
the law perfectly, they would still confront the distinct and often be-
wildering task of attempting to apply the instructions to the facts of
the case.
The point at which jurors are ready to take up the instructions has
been described as the "What do we do now?" phase of jury delibera-
tions.47 Because we can rarely observe actual juries at work,48 it is
difficult to study the deliberation process directly. Yet there are nu-
merous indications that juries lack much-needed guidance on how to
selves before being tested for comprehension); Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 43 ("The
instructions given to jurors in these cases ranged from the traditional legalese to plain
English. In all of the cases, the jury had difficulty dealing with legal concepts that they
were called upon to apply."); Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instruc-
tions That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRim. L. & CRJMINOLOGY 198,213 (1984) (report-
ing study in which mock jurors given revised instructions had 20.3% error rate, compared
with 24.3% rate for jurors using pattern instructions); Tanford, supra note 14, at 82 (noting
studies).
46. Elwork & Sales, supra note 14, at 295; Tanford, supra note 14, at 102; see Margolis
et al., supra note 11, at 138-39, 146-47 (reporting that in federal sexual harassment case
where instructions were among clearest attorneys had ever seen, jurors had little under-
standing of several of plaintiff's claims and found instructions very difficult to use); id. at
168-69 (noting that "it is not the language per se that is problematic for them, but instead,
that the legal concepts embodied in those words present comprehension difficulties"); id.
at 234-35, 288-89 (noting that federal civil antitrust jury had great difficulty understanding
non pattern instructions); id. at 291 (stating that "it is quite astonishing and disturbing how
much some of the jurors did not understand"). The problem may be that the goal of mak-
ing instructions accurate and the goal of making them comprehensible "often... come into
conflict with one another. For example, an undue emphasis upon ensuring accuracy may
result in an instruction which is not understandable to laymen." STANDARDs RELATING TO
TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 15, at 111.
47. KAssn & WRiGHTsmAN, supra note 11, at 181-82; see HANS & VIDMAR, supra
note 17, at 102 ("When finally it comes time to act, judges do not give jurors much gui-
dance on how they are supposed to go about their task. Furthermore, few jurors have had
any past experience on juries. It is no wonder, then, why jurors are sometimes initially
bewildered as they first sit down to deliberate.").
48. Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 60 (noting that this is prohibited in federal cases
by 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1988)); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 167 (West 1988) (making it
misdemeanor to eavesdrop on jury).
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employ the instructions.4 9 Those who have studied mock juries de-
scribe the discussion as being random and chaotic. "[T]he talk moves
in small bursts of coherence, shifting from topic to topic with remarka-
ble flexibility. It touches an issue, leaves it, and returns again."50 An-
other researcher found that "issues were raised and dropped fairly
unsystematically, then raised again; slowly, progress was made. '5 1
This desultory and haphazard approach would be less troubling if, in
the end, it yielded sound verdicts. But this is often not the case. In
one experiment, mock juries made numerous mistakes concerning the
law-mistakes that were not corrected in the later deliberations. This
failure to apply the law correctly was by no means a failure to take the
law seriously. Discussions of the law took up one-fifth of the delibera-
tion time and were carried out with great intensity, frequently with an
apparent sense of frustration. The jurors understood that a key aspect
of their task was to interpret the evidence in terms of the appropriate
legal categories. They struggled to do so, but often failed.5
As one group of researchers cautioned, "[u]nless some attention
is paid to the jurors' use of the instructions they are given, the never-
ending, intensive solicitude for the wording of the law is pedantry in
fantasyland ....
Every law professor knows this to be a serious problem for law
students who, while they may have mastered the black-letter law, can-
not apply it to a set of facts even after a semester or more of study.
Students can usually grasp the facts and recite the law, but they are
commonly unable to build a bridge between the two. It is only under-
standable that this should likewise be a problem for jurors who are
"doused with a kettleful of law during the charge that would make a
third-year law student blanch. 54
Evidence that jurors have difficulty knowing how to use the in-
structions flows from many sources. This was true of the two juries on
which I sat. In neither case did the jury realize, at the point when it
was ready to consider the instructions, that it should consider the
49. KASSiN & WRiGHrsMAN, supra note 11, at 214-15; Casper, supra note 14, at 432-33;
Diamond, supra note 14, at 298; Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 362; Weinstein, supra note 1,
at 187.
50. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 17, at 486.
51. Ellsworth, supra note 12, at 216.
52. Id. at 223.
53. Reifman et al., supra note 43, at 553.
54. CuRTs BoK, I Too, NICODEMUS 261-62 (1946), quoted in Skidmore v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1948), and in FRANK,
supra note 23, at 117.
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claims or offenses one at a time, and that it should decide whether or
not each of the legal elements had been established by the requisite
standard of proof.55 The juries did not know how to apply the law, as
distinct from what the law meant. Studies of actual and mock juries
suggest that my experience was not unusual.56
Social scientists have found that jurors often still cannot correctly
apply the law to a set of facts despite the fact that the jury instructions
have been greatly simplified. While such simplification may improve
juror comprehension, a substantial amount of confusion remains
which is reflected in incorrect application of the law to a determined
set of facts.5 7 Juries that as a group have good comprehension of both
the facts and the law nonetheless reach erroneous verdicts in a high
percentage of cases.58 As one researcher who studied mock juries in a
murder case concluded, "[t]he instructions may have been effective in
reminding the jurors of terms they had heard before, but the instruc-
tions were not very effective in educating them in new areas, or even
in focusing their attention on the meaning of the familiar terms."59
Also telling are studies showing that jurors frequently cannot an-
swer simple true-false questions concerning statements of law taken
55. In addition, in the civil case, after the jury decided that the defendant had breached
the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing, some jurors wanted to deny recovery
on that claim by applying the doctrine of comparative negligence; see also Lempert, Taking
Stock, supra note 11, at 212 & n.71 (noting case where jury wanted to use defense of
contributory negligence with claim involving strict liability).
56. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
57. See ELwoRK ET AL., supra note 14, at 13-17 (noting study showing that even with
revised instructions, 13% of jurors returned incorrect verdicts in sense of misapplying law
to facts as juror understood them; another study showed incorrect verdicts in 30% of cases
even with simplified instructions, as compared with error rate of 54% under pattern in-
structions); HAsTm r At.., supra note 10, at 170, 230-31, 238 (noting juror confusion in
applying instructions that were "unusually succinct, clear, and crisp," and that difficulty
persisted even where judge answered questions about specific instructions); Elwork et al.,
supra note 10, at 176 (reporting experiment in which jurors given revised instructions in
simple automobile negligence case reached erroneous verdicts in 12.5% of cases, as com-
pared with 38% error rate for jurors receiving pattern instructions); Severance et al., supra
note 45, at 205-07 (reporting experiment where instructed jurors understood law better
than uninstructed jurors, but where groups had equal difficulty applying law correctly to
given fact pattern).
58. HAs=I r EA.., supra note 10, at 80-81 (finding that even where jury, assuming
members' knowledge was pooled, correctly understood 90% of evidence and over 80% of
instructions, 43% of juries reached incorrect verdicts). This may suggest that even a slight
misunderstanding of the law can lead to an erroneous verdict; it may also indicate that the
juries never shared their individual knowledge in the deliberation process, due to the fact
that they did not know how to apply the instructions, and hence spent little time discussing
them.
59. Ellsworth, supra note 12, at 223.
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from instructions they were given in court. Their understanding is
often little better than that of persons who never heard the instruc-
tions at all.60 This suggests that the problem is not just one of compre-
hension, for jurors in these studies were not asked to explain or apply
the legal rules. Rather, it was simply a matter of whether they could
recall or recognize instructions they had heard. Even if jurors did not
understand a particular instruction, they might be expected to at least
remember it if the instruction were one with which they had struggled.
Their frequent inability to do so suggests that they may have spent
little time with the instructions, 1 perhaps because they did not know
how to use them in reaching a verdict.
Further indication that the deliberation process fails to suffi-
ciently focus on the instructions is the fact that individual jurors often
do not benefit from the superior understanding of others on the jury
panel.62 Studies show that comprehension of jury instructions-
whether standard or revised-varies among jurors, partly in relation
to their educational level.63 When a jury includes one or more mem-
60. See HAsrm ET AL., supra note 10, at 80 (finding that individual jurors tested "less
than 30 percent accurate on questions about material stated directly in the judge's final
charge, such as the elements of the legal definition of second degree murder"); Ellsworth,
supra note 12, at 218 (finding that jurors who had deliberated were able to correctly an-
swer 65% of true-false questions on elements of judge's charge, "a result not significantly
different from random guessing"); Elwork et al., supra note 10, at 175-76; Reifman et al.,
supra note 43, at 546-51 (noting that instructed jurors were able to correctly answer less
than half of questions of law pertaining to cases they had heard; their 41% correct rate
compared with 35% for uninstructed individuals).
61. See HAsrm ET AL., supra note 10, at 85-88, 162 (finding that in mock jury delibera-
tions, about 25% of jurors' remarks referred to judge's instructions, but only 14% of all
remarks involved attempts to relate evidence to law); Ellsworth, supra note 12, at 215, 218-
19 (finding that in first hour of deliberations, mock juries spent 21% of their time discuss-
ing law but that only half of their statements about law were correct); Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INsmE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUROR DECISION MAKING 42, 47-48 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) ("Our observations suggest
that jurors concentrate on comprehending trial events, constructing a fact sequence, evalu-
ating credibility, and relating the evidence to a legal category. However, they do not seem
to spend a great deal of time trying to define the legal categories, evaluating the admissibil-
ity of evidence they are using, or testing their final conclusion against a standard of
proof.").
62. Ellsworth, supra note 12, at 219 ("The jury as a whole does not profit from the
abilities of its best members when it comes to questions of law."); cf. Lary Lawrence, To-
ward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An Argument for Limited Enforcement of Con-
sumer Promises, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 815 (1987) (noting similar inability of consumers to
benefit from each other's knowledge, due to lack of adequate means of communication).
63. ELwoRK ET AL., supra note 14, at 58-59; HANS & VnMAR, supra note 17, at 121;
HAS-m ET AL., supra note 10, at 137; Charrow & Charrow, supra note 45, at 1320-21, 1365.
But see Reifman et al., supra note 43, at 550 (finding no difference in actual jurors' ability
to answer questions about instructions based on level of jurors' nonlegal education).
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bers who, between them, understand all or most of the law, the entire
panel should benefit from that knowledge, but only if it is shared.
While there is evidence that deliberations do sometimes enhance ju-
rors' comprehension of the law,64 the improvement is far from opti-
mal. In one extensive study, the typical jury panel had a collective
comprehension level of more than eighty percent when its members'
individual knowledge was pooled. Yet the average juror, after delib-
erations,6' still understood less than thirty percent of the law in the
instructions.66 The fact that individual comprehension rates remained
at a level less than half the group's level indicates that little knowledge
was exchanged during the deliberations. 67 For-whatever reason, the
average jury does not discuss the instructions sufficiently to benefit
from the understanding of its most enlightened members. This
strongly suggests that the problem juries face in applying the law to
the facts is not merely one of difficulty in comprehending the instruc-
tions. Even when some jurors do understand the law, the instructions
apparently play but a peripheral role in the deliberation process.
64. See, eg., Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 132 (noting that members of alternative
jury panel who observed trial and heard instructions in federal sexual harassment case, but
who did not participate in three-day deliberation process with regular jurors, had much less
sophisticated understanding of legal principles involved); e at 341-42, 387-92, 399-400
(reporting that alternate jury in federal criminal insurance fraud prosecution spent one
hour deliberating, as compared with five hours for actual jury, because alternate jurors
were so confused by instructions that they did not discuss them at all); it at 531-34 (noting
there is often at least one member of jury who understands law well and who can educate
other jurors); cf. Severance et al., supra note 45, at 205-07, 223-25 (reporting study in
which'deliberations increased jurors' understanding of law but only when instructions were
initially relatively clear).
65. The average jury in this study deliberated for 138 minutes, with the longest deliber-
ation lasting four days; if jurors wished, portions of the instructions would be reread to
them. HASrm ET AL., supra note 10, at 42, 51.
66. 1e at 80-81.
67. A possible explanation is that the knowledge is shared during deliberations but that
jhrors who are right about the law are unable to convince the others. See KAssiN &
WRmI-r5SMAN, supra note 11, at 146 (noting that juries that have access to written instruc-
tions during deliberations have better understanding of law and are less confused in their
deliberations); Ellsworth, supra note 12, at 218-24 (finding that in experiment where jurors
were not allowed to take copy of instructions into jury room and had to rely entirely on
their memory of judge's oral charge, deliberations did not enhance level of understanding
because jurors who correctly stated law were not sure enough of their position to persuade
others, at least not without set of instructions to back them up); Margolis et al., supra note
11, at 532 (suggesting that having copy of instructions in jury room is crucial to improving
jury's understanding of law since jurors no longer have to rely solely on memory). In the
experiment noted in the text, because the juries could have portions of the videotaped
instructions played back to them on request, lack of access to the instructions does'not
account for the fact that individual post-deliberation comprehension levels were 30%, as
compared with the optimal group level of 80%. See HASTm E-T AL., supra note 10, at 51.
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In addition to not knowing how to use the instructions, the jury's
difficulties in applying the law may also stem from an unconscious
resistance to examining the judge's charge too closely. Psychologists
have found considerable support for the theory that jurors use a
"story model" to evaluate the evidence and reach a verdict. 8 The
model identifies three distinct steps in the jurors' decision-making
process: First, as the trial proceeds, jurors organize the evidence by
imposing a narrative on the facts, constructing a story that best ex-
plains "what happened" in the case;69 second, jurors learn from the
judge's instructions what the possible "verdict categories" or options
are; and finally, jurors compare their story with the verdict options
and select that verdict which provides the closest match or fit with the
narrative they have built.7"
The "central claim of the theory is that the story will determine
the decision that the juror reaches."71 Since the process of construct-
ing a narrative produces a tentative predeliberation decision before a
juror has received any instruction on the law,7' the instructions pose a
dual threat. First, they may be difficult for jurors to break down into
their component elements or "feature lists." 73 Second, they may pro-
duce cognitive dissonance,74 for they might not allow the outcome
68. See HAsTm ET AL., supra note 10, at 22-23; Ellsworth, supra note 12, at 206, 214-17;
James A. Holstein, Jurors' Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 83 passim (1985); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror
Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: Ti PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING,
supra note 61, at 192, 199.
69. For an interesting cognitive analysis of how jurors construct their stories, see Albert
J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 27 UCLA L. REy. 273
(1989).
70. HA=I ET AL., supra note 10, at 22-23, 163-65; Pennington & Hastie, supra note
68, at 192-221.
71. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 68, at 196.
72. Id. at 193, 196, 201, 217.
73. Id. at 200 ("[The juror's mental representation of [verdict definition information
in the judge's charge probably] takes the form of a category label with a list of features. In
all respects, this is a difficult one-trial learning task. If the juror has no prior knowledge of
the legal categories, then learning of the abstract information is extremely difficult. In the
case where prior knowledge is available, it is as likely to interfere ivith accurate under-
standing as to help. . . ."). The task is also complicated by the fact that in moving from the
story construction phase to that of reaching a verdict, the juror must shift from a narrative
process of thought to a more complex classification process that is both reasoned and de-
liberate. Id. at 200-01, 205.
74. Cognitive dissonance occurs whenever there is an inconsistency between two of our
attitudes or beliefs, or between attitudes and behavior. Moore, supra note 69, at 302 n.100
(citing L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-5 (1957)). Moore dis-
cusses the role of cognitive dissonance as it relates to jurors' filtering out trial evidence that
may be inconsistent with the story they have constructed. Though he does not discuss the
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called for by the juror's story.75 Studies in fact indicate that if a juror's
story and her chosen verdict do not closely match, the juror will expe-
rience dissatisfaction and a lack of confidence in the verdict.76
It is therefore only natural that jurors may be reluctant to scruti-
nize the judge's instructions too closely.7 7 One study thus found that
"many jurors simply appear to select a sketchy stereotyped theme to
summarize what happened (e.g., 'cold-hearted killer plots revenge,'
'nice guy panics and overreacts') and then choose a verdict on the
basis of the severity of the crime as they perceive it."'78 This accounts
for the fact that juries at times overlook key but unsettling elements of
the instructions.79
The effort to avoid cognitive dissonance may explain, in psycho-
logical terms, why juries sometimes decide cases on the basis of in-
stinct, emotion, or conscience, rather than according to the letter of
similar problem that occurs when the jury confronts the legal instructions, the phenome-
non would seem to be virtually the same.
75. According to the story model, if the fit between the juror's initial best story and the
verdict options is poor, it is possible that the story may be adjusted; but, if it cannot be, the
juror must choose the default verdict-for example, in a criminal case, the juror must find
the defendant not guilty. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 68, at 201-03.
76. Reid Hastie, Introduction to INSIDE THE JUROR: Tim PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DE-
CISION MAKING, supra note 61, at 26; Pennington & Hastie, supra note 68, at 201.
77. Cognitive dissonance theory has demonstrated that "[p]eople generally try to mini-
mize cognitive dissonance, that is, inconsistencies between their actions and their attitudes
and beliefs." Moore, supra note 69, at 302, 303 & n.104.
78. Ellsworth, supra note 61, at 48. Jurors who are later tested for knowledge of the
instructions do not have a better understanding of the elements of the verdict option that
fits their story. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 68, at 208. This reinforces the idea that
juries may not examine the instructions very closely, for one would otherwise expect them
to have the best understanding of the verdict that most closely matches the story they have
constructed.
79. For example, in the criminal case on which I sat as a juror, the defendant was
charged with assault with intent to inflict severe bodily harm and with false imprisonment.
See supra note 2. Most of the jurors believed the defendant had acted improperly toward
the victim. We first voted to acquit on the assault charge because no one thought the
defendant had intended to harm the victim. The jury then took up the false imprisonment
charge and quickly concluded that the defendant was guilty on this count. However, no
one focused on the requirement that the victim must have been prevented in her person
from leaving the premises. See CAIjFoRNiA JURY INSTRUCIONS: CRiMINAL (CALJIC)
No. 16.135 (5th ed. 1988) [hereinafter CALJIC]. When this element was finally pointed
out, everyone recalled that the victim testified that she at no time felt she could not leave
the shopping plaza; she simply refused to leave without her car, explaining, "Me and my
car, why we go everywhere together!" We then voted to acquit on the false imprisonment
charge. However, there was a shared dissatisfaction with the overall result. Jurors talked
about the fact that prosecutors might have charged the defendant with mere assault, an
option not presented to the jury. There was also talk of sending a message along with the
verdict, to the effect that the defendant should not take the verdict as reflecting jury ap-
proval of his conduct.
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the law. The theory suggests that such departures may often be un-
conscious, not deliberate. If, in addition to feeling a psychological
aversion to the instructions, jurors are also unaware of how to use the
instructions, it is even more understandable that they have difficulty
applying the law to the facts.
To the extent that the story model accurately portrays a juror's
decision-making process, all the more reason exists for courts to help
juries focus on the instructions. By suggesting that they approach
each claim or offense systematically, in a step-by-step fashion, and by
having the law presented to them in a factual context, it is less likely
that critical elements will be inadvertently overlooked. To be sure, the
jury might in the end decide to ignore the law, but such departures
may be less frequent than when the jury does not even realize that it
has failed to follow the law.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL INSTRUCTION
A. The Proposal
To help juries apply the law to the facts, the judge should give a
special instruction suggesting to the jury how it might use the instruc-
tions in their deliberations. The instruction would direct the jury to
those parts of the charge in which the elements of the plaintiff's
claims or the criminal offenses are defined. It would recommend that
if there is more than one claim or offense, the jury take these up one
at a time. Jurors would be advised to consider each claim or offense in
a step-by-step fashion, asking whether or not based on the evidence
introduced at trial, each element was established by the requisite bur-
den of proof.
The wording of this instruction would vary slightly depending on
the case. In a civil action involving claims for breach of contract, libel,
and assault, the instruction might read as follows:
USING THE INSTRUCTIONS
In a few minutes you will retire to begin your delibera-
tions. Before you do so, I want to make a suggestion that
you may find helpful in using these instructions.
As you know, the plaintiff in this case has asserted three
claims against the defendant. These claims are for breach of
contract, libel, and assault. I explained to you earlier in
these instructions that each of the plaintiff's claims is made
up of certain elements or requirements. In order for the
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plaintiff to win on any of these claims, the plaintiff must
prove each element of that claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.
My suggestion to you is this. When you are ready to use
these instructions, you might take up the plaintiff's claims
one at a time. As you consider each claim, look at the in-
structions to see what the specific elements or requirements
for proving that claim are. You should then discuss each of
these elements one at a time, in the order that they are listed
in the instructions.
If you find that the plaintiff has proved all of the ele-
ments of a claim by a preponderance of the evidence, then
the plaintiff is entitled to win on that claim. If, on the other
hand, you conclude that the plaintiff has failed to prove one
or more of the elements of a claim by a preponderance of the
evidence, the plaintiff loses on that claim.
After you have finished considering the plaintiff's first
claim, go to the next claim and discuss it in the same way,
one element at a time. Continue in this manner until you
have decided upon all of the plaintiff's claims.80
In terms of timing, this instruction should be given immediately
before the jury retires to deliberate. If the jurisdiction allows the
judge to instruct the jury both before and after closing arguments,,'
the bulk of the instructions, including a description of the elements of
the claims or offenses,82 should.preferably be given before closing ar-
guments. This will enable counsel to structure closing arguments
around the instructions.8 " After counsel's summations to the jury, a
80. This instruction would need to be adapted for criminal cases, and for affirmative
defenses, counterclaims, or cross-claims in civil cases. However, the underlying theory
should remain the same, that is, encouraging the jury to proceed systematically in an ele-
ment-by-element fashion. If it is feared that jurors might give disproportionate weight to
the proposed instruction, it might be followed by the standard admonition reminding ju-
rors not to single out any individual instruction and ignore the others. See, e.g., CALIEnOR-
NIA JURY INSTRUCTrONS: Crvm (BAI) No. 1.01 (7th ed. 1986) [hereinafter BAJI].
81. This is permitted, for example, in federal courts, see FED. R. Cv. P. 51; FED. R.
CRnm. P. 30, and in California state courts, see CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 607 (West 1976);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(e)-(f) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
82. The court might give the bulk of the instructions prior to closing argument and
state the elements of the claims or offenses afterwards. See People v. Lamb, 206 Cal. App.
3d 399, 253 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1988). While this has the advantage of making sure the ele-
ments are fresh in the jurors' minds, it makes it difficult in closing arguments for counsel to
tie the evidence to the law the jurors will need to apply.
83. This is the heart of the second proposal made in this Essay. See infra part VI.
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few final instructions would be delivered,' including the instruction
proposed here.85 If the jurisdiction requires the judge to give all of
the substantive instructions after closing arguments, this special in-
struction should be given at the end of the charge, just before the jury
retires.
Since the purpose of this instruction is to focus jurors' attention
on the instructions and encourage them to approach this part of their
task in a systematic manner, it is imperative that jurors be allowed to
take a written copy of the instructions with them into the jury room.
6
Otherwise, they will have to depend on their ability to recall the in-
structions; if the instructions are lengthy, this will be virtually impossi-
ble.87 Moreover, without the ability to refer to the instructions, those
jurors who do correctly recall the law as stated by the judge may be
unable to persuade the other jurors that they are right.88
B. Rationale and Justification
The instruction proposed here furthers three distinct and impor-
tant goals. First, it may help to produce better verdicts in the sense
that they are based on the law. If a jury does not know how to use the
instructions, any correlation between the verdict and the law is likely
to be purely coincidental. A jury that applies the instructions in a
systematic way is less likely to overlook key elements of law.89 In the
felony case on which I sat, the jury was on the verge of convicting the
defendant for false imprisonment when it was pointed out that one
element of the offense, which had not been discussed at all, was
84. For a sample set of instructions in which the judge delivers the bulk of the general
instructions prior to closing arguments, with a few procedural "closing instructions" deliv-
ered afterward, see William W Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Rem-
edies, 69 CAL. L. REv. 731, 755-56, 759-69 (1981).
85. To assure that the court has the jury's full attention, it would perhaps make sense to
give a brief recess between closing arguments and the final instructions. "In my experi-
ence, so long as the jurors are given a short break following closing arguments, they are
likely to be eager to pay attention to the neutral arguments of the judge after having been
surfeited with lawyers' arguments tailored to meet their clients' needs." Weinstein, supra
note 1, at 171 n.30.
86. See supra notes 35 and 67. In both of the cases on which I sat, the jury was allowed
to take a set of the written instructions into the jury room.
87. See KAssIN & WIGHrsMAN, supra note 11, at 146 (noting that juries given copy of
written instructions have better understanding of law and more confidence in their ver-
dicts); Elwork & Sales, supra note 14, at 290.
88. See supra note 67.
89. See Elwork & Sales, supra note 14, at 287 (noting that juries that cannot under-
stand instructions are less likely to discuss critical points of law).
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clearly not established by the evidence.90 Even in a case where there
is to be jury nullification, the jury must be conscious of the fact that it
is refusing to follow the law. Otherwise, while the verdict is literally
lawless, it is probably not defensible on the ground that it reflects
community notions of fairness and justice.
Second, the proposed instruction should reduce the amount of
time spent in deliberations. In each of the cases on which I sat, the
jury did not know where to begin in terms of how to access the in-
structions. The set of written instructions given to the jury consisted
of a stack of half and whole sheets of paper clipped together, each
page containing one instruction.91 The pages at the top of the stack
did not talk about the claims or offenses. These were to be found
further down in the pile. The jurors had no clue that most of the in-
structions dealt with general principles to be used in evaluating the
evidence, and that the heart of their task involved the relatively few
pages defining the elements of the claims or offenses. 92 What the jury
needed was a sign that read, "Start here!"
When a jury knows what its task is, it wastes less time trying to
figure out what to do and less time talking about irrelevant matters.93
Moreover, if it is clear that a claim or offense consists of a series of
elements each of which must be proved, a jury may be able to save
time by going for the jugular. In the civil case on which I sat, the
claims for intentional and negligent interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage both required that the defendant "knew of the exist-
ence of the relationship" 94 in question. Once the jury realized that
90. The element in question required that the victim's "personal liberty" have been
restrained and that the "person" was prevented from leaving the premises. The victim
admitted on the witness stand that she felt free to leave at all times. See CAIC, supra
note 79. The jury ultimately acquitted defendant on this charge. See supra note 79.
91. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 607a (West 1976) (requiring that each instruction
submitted by counsel be on separate sheet of paper); CAL. R. Or. 229(b).
92. For another instance where the jury did not know what to do with the instructions,
see Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 341-42, 375-76, 387-92, 396-97, 399-400 (reporting that
in federal criminal trial for insurance fraud, though instructions followed step-by-step for-
mat and prosecutor's closing argument linked evidence to offenses, three-member alter-
nate jury ignored instructions entirely and used indictment-which included offenses for
which defendant had not been charged; after one hour, alternate panel returned guilty
verdicts on all counts; actual 12-member jury figured out how to use instructions on second
day of deliberations and then analyzed offenses element-by-element, carefully examining
evidence; after five hours of deliberation, it returned guilty verdicts on all counts; that
these two juries reached same verdicts appears to have been purely coincidental).
93. See ELWORK ET AL., supra note 14, at 16 (noting that juries using standard instruc-
tions spent more time talking about "legally inappropriate topics" than did those that re-
ceived more comprehensible instructions); Elwork & Sales, supra note 14, at 286-87.
94. See BAR, supra note 80, Nos. 7.82 & 7.82.1 (7th ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994).
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this was an essential element of each claim, it took less than five min-
utes to dispose of them, for there was no evidence introduced at trial
from which such knowledge could be inferred.
Third, the proposed instruction will help structure the delibera-
tion process without the negative features that accompany special ver-
dicts and general verdicts with interrogatories.95 Unlike those devices,
no issues are taken from the jury, and no external controls are placed
upon it. The jury remains the master of its deliberations and is free to
proceed as it wishes. Moreover, the proposed instruction places few
additional burdens on the court. Because it involves a pattern form
requiring only slight adaptation to the case, it does not have the draw-
backs of attempting to tailor the entire set of instructions to the indi-
vidual case.96 While the latter approach is no doubt superior in terms
of helping juries to comprehend and apply the law, it is probably so
burdensome as to be administratively infeasible in most cases.
C. Response to Potential Criticism
Some might argue that this proposal is unnecessary because the
court or counsel, or both, have already achieved its purposes. It might
also be contended that the proposal improperly interferes with a law-
yer's prerogative to present the case as the lawyer sees fit. I will ad-
dress each of these concerns.
1. Courts and counsel now provide this guidance
Most standard jury instructions define each claim or offense as
consisting of a set of specific elements. The jury is advised that in
order to find for the plaintiff in a civil case, or for the state in a crimi-
nal case, it must find each element of the claim or offense to have
been satisfied in accord with the requisite burden of proof.97 Conse-
95. See supra notes 23-31, 38-40 and accompanying text.
96. For a set of instructions tailored to the facts of an automobile negligence case and
used in an experiment with mock jurors, see Elwork et al., supra note 10, at 184-86; cf.
David U. Strawn et al., Reaching a Verdict, Step by Step, 60 JuDIcATuRE 383,385-86 (1977)
(recommending use of "process" instructions that are written and tailored to each case and
that consist of series of questions that break each legal issue down into its smallest possible
components).
97. See, e.g., BAJI, supra note 80, No. 2.60; Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal
Jury Instructions 73-159 (1988); see also Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 401-19 (describing
federal criminal insurance fraud case in which instructions gave jury step-by-step approach
for deciding whether defendant was guilty on each count of indictment); ia at 538-74 (dis-
cussing federal trade secrets case in which instructions set forth each of 11 claims for relief,
element-by-element). In neither of these cases, however, did the instructions tell the jury
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quently, it might seem that the proposed instruction is redundant and
unnecessary.
While this might be true in theory, the fact is that in the two cases
on which I sat as a juror, the instructions were in the form described
above, yet this was not enough to make clear to either jury how it
ought to proceed. And as noted earlier, the instructions setting forth
the elements of the claims or offenses are usually buried in the middle
of the judge's charge,98 or, in a case involving multiple claims or
counts, they may be scattered throughout a long set of instructions.99
In either case, by the time the court gets to the end, the jury may have
no idea how to undertake deliberations. The matter is compounded if
the bulk of the instructions are given prior to closing arguments, for
then the mention of the elements is still more remote in time and thus
even less likely to give juries the necessary guidance.
Instructions that merely set forth the elements of a claim or of-
fense fail to expressly tell juries that as a strategy for conducting delib-
erations, they should deal with the claims or offenses one at a time,
element by element, asking whether or not each element has been
proved.100 To be sure, some juries figure this out from the way the
instructions are framed. A further clue may be provided if the verdict
form asks the jury to state its verdict separately for each claim.' 0' But
that some juries catch on cannot make up for the fact that many
others do not.
that it might take up the claims or offenses one at a time and proceed through each of them
element-by-element.
98. See, e.g., Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 293-327 (reporting that in civil antitrust
action, portion of instructions that defined elements of claims appeared on pages six
through 23 of 35-page set of typewritten instructions).
99. See, eg., id. at 401-19 (reporting that in criminal insurance fraud action, elements
of offenses were scattered throughout 20 pages of typewritten instructions).
100. See id, at 119, 124, 135, 176-84 (revealing that in federal sexual harassment case
using instructions that broke down each claim element-by-element, and that lawyers said
"were the finest, most easily comprehended [instructions] that they had ever seen," jury
still found it difficult to follow step-by-step process outlined in instructions).
101. See Ut at 442, 481-82, 495, 499-500, 507, 538-77 (noting that in federal trade secrets
case where verdict form required that jury separately state its verdict for each of 11 claims
for relief, and instructions set forth each claim element-by-element, jury began delibera-
tions by taking up claims in order and discussed evidence as it related to each claim; it may
have been critical that two of six regular jurors in this case were electrical engineers; a five-
member alternate jury that included two teachers proceeded in similar manner). In the
civil case on which I sat, a special verdict form was used which asked the jury to state its
verdict separately for each of the five claims for relief. This no doubt helped to focus the
jury on the individual claims; however, it did not highlight the fact that each of the claims
was made up of a series of elements to be approached one at a time.
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It might also be argued that the suggested instruction is unneces-
sary because lawyers provide juries with this guidance in their closing
arguments.' °2 However, the court cannot count on this, for not all
lawyers take the jury through a step-by-step review of what it needs to
do to reach a verdict. Rather than leaving the matter to chance,
courts should give the instruction proposed here in all cases, as a clear
and explicit means of helping juries to conduct their deliberations
properly.
2. Interference with counsel's prerogative
Sometimes lawyers do not provide juries with this type of gui-
dance for strategic reasons. Counsel may not want the jury to focus
closely on the law,10 3 as doing so may be detrimental to their case.104
There are no doubt instances where one or both lawyers want a jury
that is incapable of properly applying the instructions. If the jury was
selected on this principle, as it sometimes is, 05 counsel will surely
have no desire to clarify the law or the method of applying it.106 Yet
the court should not lend its assistance to such schemes. The judge
has a responsibility to help assure that the jury decides the case on the
evidence and the law. Notwithstanding the adversarial system, it is
the court's obligation to see that the jury is properly instructed. 07
102. See id. at 153 (describing federal sexual harassment case where defense lawyer's
closing argument gave jury guidelines for determining whether there had been harass-
ment); id. at 274 (noting that in federal antitrust action, closing arguments told jury what it
had to do and what each side must prove to win); Tanford, supra note 14, at 103-06.
103. Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 57, 118 (noting that lawyers sometimes oppose use
of special verdict even when it is combined with general verdict).
104. See ELwoRK ET A.., supra note 14, at 16-17 (noting that in mock automobile negli-
gence cases, failure to understand pattern instructions led to more plaintiff verdicts and to
higher plaintiff verdicts, due to difficulty of law of contributory negligence); HANS & VID-
mAR, supra note 17, at 117 (suggesting that more legally inclined juries more closely resem-
ble judges, and noting that in criminal cases at least there are differences between how
judges and juries tend to rule).
105. See F. LEE BALEY, To BE A TRrAL LAWYER 118 (1985) ("A lawyer who has what
he believes is a very weak case may be interested in impaneling twelve people of limited
intellectual ability."); Ellsworth, supra note 12, at 207 (observing that attorneys sometimes
select jurors for their perceived incompetence); Lempert, Taking Stock, supra note 11, at
204 n.48, 229.
106. See Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 355-56, 365 (suggesting that some resistance to
simplifying instructions stems from lawyers' desire to confuse jury); Frederick Woleslagel,
The "Kiss" Principle of Jury Communication, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 252, 254 (1975) ("There
even have been times when it seemed the lawyer, in a case with all the evidence running
against him, sought instructions that would so baffle a jury that they could not reach a
verdict.").
107. 8A JAMES WM. MooRE ET AI.., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAMCE 30.03[1] (2d ed.
1994) (stating that in criminal cases, "the trial judge is responsible for charging the jury in
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Just as counsel cannot entirely waive instructing the jury or consent to
the use of erroneous instructions,108 lawyers have no right to have the
instructions presented in a way that makes them useless to the jury' 0 9
While American lawyers at one time could urge the jury to apply
whatever law it believed appropriate, 10 nearly every American juris-
diction today limits counsel's role to arguing the facts."' Thus, even if
it is true that some lawyers may prefer to keep a jury in the dark, that
is no reason for the court to refrain from giving the guidance neces-
sary for the jury to employ the instructions properly. As Judge Ed-
ward Devitt said thirty years ago, "[t]he nub of our job is to tell the
jury what the pertinent law is so that the members will understand
it.""12
compliance with the evidence and the law, regardless of whether the parties have so re-
quested"); STANDARDs RELATING TO TRL4J BY JURY, supra note 15, at 115-16 (indicating
that judge in criminal case has independent responsibility to ensure that certain essential
instructions are given, and that concept of waiver does not apply); 5 BERNARD E. WITKIN
& NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRmuNAL LAW §§ 2924-2925 (2d ed. 1989) (noting
that judge in criminal case must instruct on general principles of law necessary to jury's
understanding of case, even if counsel do not request such instructions); 7 BERNARD E.
WrrniN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 243 (3d ed. 1985) (advising that court in civil cases has
duty to see that jury is given guidance on controlling legal principles and basic issues of
case); 9 CnHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2552 (1971) ("Ultimately it is the responsibility of the court to be sure that the jury
is properly instructed."); Elwork & Sales, supra note 14, at 281 (observing that some state
courts have held that in criminal cases judge is responsible for ensuring that jurors under-
stand law).
108. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127 (West 1985) (mandating that court in criminal
case must refuse to give requested instruction that is not correct); 5A MOORE ET AL., supra
note 107, at 51.04 (noting that in civil cases, trial court's instructions may be reversed on
appeal, even absent objection by counsel, if they contain plain or fundamental error that
would produce miscarriage of justice); 5 Wrnrxj & EPsEIN, supra note 107, § 2923 (indi-
cating that judge may modify any proposed instruction to correct defects); 7 WrrmN, supra
note 107, §§ 240, 247 (noting that judge in civil case may refuse to give proposed instruc-
tions that are misleading or incorrect); 9 WRIGrT & MILLER, supra note 107, § 2558 (1971
& Supp. 1993) (providing that in civil cases, federal appellate court may reverse on basis of
plain error in instructions, even if counsel raised no objection).
109. Concerning a lawyer's ethical obligation not to deliberately seek to confuse the
jury, see infra note 138 and accompanying text.
110. See Stefan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VER-
DICr. AssESSING THE Civn. JURY SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 22,32-47; Note, The Changing
Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
111. See, e.g., Friedenthal et al., supra note 24, at 462; cf. supra note 28 and accompany-
ing text (noting that juries are not permitted to decide questions of law in most
jurisdictions).
112. Edward J. Devitt, Ten Practical Suggestions About Federal Jury Instructions, 38
F.R.D. 75, 79 (1966).
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V. PROPOSAL FOR LINKING THE LAW TO THE FAcTS
A. The Proposal
It has often been recommended that when judges instruct a jury,
they should weave in the facts, the evidence, or the parties' conten-
tions, so that the law is presented to the jury in the context of the
specific case.113 However, if the court is unwilling to marshall the evi-
dence in this way, it should at least hold out the threat of exercising its
right to summarize the evidence as a means of encouraging counsel to
tie the law to the facts in their closing arguments. The judge might
advise counsel that unless they do this, the court will marshall the evi-
dence for the jury at the end of counsel's own summations. The
court's summary might be no more elaborate than a statement of the
parties' opposing contentions on each legal issue. In this way, jurors
will have been provided-either by counsel or by the court-with a
bridge between the instructions and the evidence, thereby improving
the quality of the deliberation process.
B. Rationale and Justification
When a judge weaves the facts or the parties' contentions into the
charge to the jury, the court exercises, in a limited fashion, its right to
summarize the evidence.114 In doing so, the judge aids the jury in two
separate but related senses. First, when the facts illuminate the ab-
stract legal concepts set forth in the instructions, jurors' understanding
of the law greatly improves115 While the court might use hypothetical
rather than actual facts to achieve this goal,
Djudges are often reluctant to use examples which have not
received appellate court approval for fear of committing re-
versible error. Some jurors stated, however, that they would
113. See, e.g., Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 293-327 (reporting that judge in federal
civil antitrust action summarized parties' contentions on each point in charge to jury but
without reference to specific evidence); Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 357-58; Schwarzer,
supra note 84, at 744-45 ("Instructions should incorporate the relevant persons, transac-
tions, conduct, and events and state concretely the questions the jury is to decide."); Wein-
stein, supra note 1, at 173.
114. See Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 357-58; Weinstein, supra note 1, at 172-73 (noting
six different ways in which judges may summarize evidence). In contrast to a judicial com-
ment on the evidence, a summary does not give the jury advice on evaluating credibility or
assessing the weight and sufficiency of the evidence; nor, of course, would it encompass the
judge's own impression of the evidence. Id. at 168. 1
115. Elwork et al., supra note 10, at 172 ("In helping interpret the evidence, jury instruc-
tions should explain how the facts of a case relate to the legal issues involved and how the
legal issues, in turn, relate to a verdict."); Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 46-48; Tanford,
supra note 14, at 82-83; Weinstein, supra note 1, at 173.
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have appreciated examples or illustrations to give meaning
to the legal definitions, for even though the surface language
might be straightforward, the concepts at issue were
unfamiliar.1
1 6
Unless counsel or the court makes an effort to present the law as it
relates to the facts of the case, the law may be virtually
incomprehensible.
For example, in the civil case on which I sat as a juror, one of
plaintiff's claims was for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. While the jury was instructed on this claim, it did not
have the vaguest idea of how the abstract legal instruction pertained
to the case. It was not clear what contract such a covenant might have
been a part of, nor what conduct of defendant's might have amounted
to a lack of good faith or fair dealing. No examples were given in
either the instructions or in closing arguments, nor was the instruction
in any other way linked to the facts of the case.1 17 The jury was in the
same boat as a first-year law student who, after taking a contracts
exam based on the facts of this case, realized that he failed to "spot"
the implied covenant issue. In contrast to law students, however, ju-
ries are not expected to "spot the issue." That is the job of counsel
and the court.
Second, by utilizing the facts to illustrate the law, the jury's ability
to use the instructions in a systematic manner is enhanced, reducing
the possibility that it may overlook key elements or evidence critical
to the outcome of the case. 8 If, on the other hand, a jury does not
know what a particular legal element means or how it relates to the
case, the jury may simply ignore it.
116. Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 47; id. at 47-48 (citing instances where jurors might
have benefited from examples illustrating legal concepts and suggesting that these be ad-
ded to judge's instructions).
117. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing would have sprung to life had the jury
been told that in the context of this case, the covenant was an implied part of the plaintiff's
contract of employment with the hospital. The covenant then would have been violated if
the jury found that the hospital, after not renewing plaintiff's employment, failed to give
him adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to retrieve his belongings before they
were destroyed.
118. See Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 349, 374-75 (reporting that in criminal insur-
ance fraud case where federal prosecutors used closing argument to link evidence to
charged offenses, jury on second day of deliberations used indictment to itemize exactly
what each count required and to enumerate evidence presented by government; until that
point, jury had been leaning 10 to two toward acquittal; it ultimately voted unanimously to
convict).
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The court's ability to integrate the law and the facts, through ex-
ercise of its right to summarize the evidence, is thus of vital impor-
tance. Judges enjoy this right in the federal courts,119 and in roughly
forty of the fifty states. 20 Yet the right is apparently exercised infre-
quently.' 2 1 There are several reasons for this. For one thing, it places
considerable added burdens on the court. If the court knows that it
may have to later summarize the evidence, the judge must follow the
trial more closely and perhaps take careful notes.'22 The judge must
also prepare a written draft of the proposed summary, 23 so that it can
be shared with counsel.' 4 Besides creating extra work, summarizing
the evidence creates added risks of reversal. If the summary is not
balanced, and emphasizes the evidence of one party at the expense of
another, this may amount to reversible error.12 In states that permit
judges to summarize the evidence but not to comment upon it, a one-
sided or partisan summary may be deemed a judicial commentary and
thus grounds for reversal.' 26
119. Federal judges may summarize the evidence in both civil and criminal cases. See
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469-71 (1933); Bolita J. Laws et al., The Right of a
Judge to Comment on the Evidence in His Charge to the Jury, Discussion at the Judicial
Administration Section of the American Bar Association (date unknown), in 6 F.R.D. 317,
320-26 (1947); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 162 (noting that when Congress declined to
approve proposed Federal Rule of Evidence that would have codified right of federal
judges to summarize and comment upon evidence, it did so with understanding that this
would leave intact federal judges' existing authority to summarize and comment).
120. NmLAND, supra note 5, at 31-33 (updating data from KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra
note 17, at 420, which found that as of 1966, only 28 states allowed judges to summarize
evidence); see, eg., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 608 (West 1976) (allowing judge to "state the
testimony of the case").
121. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 17, at 417-27; Weinstein, supra note 1, at 169.
122. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 186-87 (suggesting that this added labor, together with
increased risk of reversal, largely explains why American judges, in contrast to their British
counterparts, seldom summarize by undertaking a "full treatment of the evidence").
123. See Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 234-35 (discussing federal judge in civil anti-
trust action who summarized parties' contentions in charge to jury, but without reference
to specific evidence, and who prepared draft of instructions before trial began).
124. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 170, 186 (advising that judge planning to summarize
evidence should prepare comments in advance and share them with counsel to avoid risk-
ing reversal by inadvertently misstating parties' contentions). To the extent a judge plans
to deliver the summary as part of the instructions, statutes and court rules requiring the
judge to inform counsel of the instructions in advance might be deemed to apply to the
court's summary as well. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 607a (stating that court must,
upon request, "advise counsel of all instructions to be given").
125. Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 744-45 n.69; Weinstein, supra note 1, at 176.
126. STA NDA S RELATING TO TRiAL nY JURY, supra note 15, at 125-26; Weinstein,
supra note 1, at 168 ("To the extent that a summary given by the court falls short of a
recitation of the entire transcript, the very process of choosing which testimony to review
and which to leave out is in itself a comment on the evidence.").
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If a judge is unwilling to summarize the evidence, the court
should at least threaten that it will invoke this power. This may in-
duce counsel to perform this function instead. If the advocates pro-
vide the jury with a summary that links the law to the facts, the judge
is then relieved of this duty. Of course, if the lawyers refuse, or if they
fail to do an adequate job of it,'27 the court will have to make good on
its threat by giving the jury its own summary of the evidence.'2 8 How-
ever, there are ways of making this task less onerous for the court, as
explained further below.
C. Response to Potential Criticism
A number of objections might be raised to this proposal. Specifi-
cally, one might contend that it is unnecessary because lawyers al-
ready perform this function; that it is undesirable because to the
extent that lawyers fail to link the law to the facts, this is for sound
strategic reasons which courts should respect; that the proposal is self-
defeating because it will only further confuse jurors; and that the idea
is unrealistic because judges will never adopt it.
1. Good lawyers already do it
It might be thought that the proposal advanced here is unneces-
sary because all competent lawyers explain the law to the jury by
127. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 169-70 (noting that whether or not judge summa-
rizes or comments upon evidence may in part depend on whether counsel's closing argu-
ments are confusing or misleading).
128. The timing of the court's summary will turn on whether the jurisdiction permits
judges to instruct the jury before and after closing arguments, as is now true in federal
court, see FED. R. Crv. P. 51; FED. P. CiRi. P. 30, or whether it follows the traditional rule
that substantive instructions must be given after closing arguments. See, e.g., Schwarzer,
supra note 84, at 755. If the court must instruct the jury after closing arguments, the
judge's summary of the evidence would be delivered with or immediately following the
substantive instructions. By contrast, under the federal courts' approach, substantive in-
structions are normally given before closing arguments as this affords "counsel the oppor-
tunity to explain the instructions, argue their application to the facts and thereby give the
jury the maximum assistance in determining the issues and arriving at a good verdict on the
law and the evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 51 advisory committee's note. If counsel do not
invoke this opportunity, the court would then give the jury its summary after closing argu-
ments. If it is clear in advance that counsel do not intend to summarize the evidence, the
court might deliver its summary with the substantive instructions rather than waiting until
after closing arguments. California permits the judge in civil and criminal cases to give the
instructions before or after closing arguments or both. See CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 607;
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(e)-(f) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); WELLS & PEARLMAN, supra
note 25, § 1.03[5]; 5 WrrnTN & EPsTEiN, supra note 107, § 2930 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994).
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weaving the evidence into the instructions in closing arguments.129 To
the extent that attorneys in fact do this, the proposal places no added
burdens on either counsel or the court. The reality, however, is that
lawyers oftentimes do not provide the jury with this type of assistance.
To the extent that counsel discuss the instructions, they often empha-
size only a few of them, with the result that jurors remain unenlight-
ened as to many critical points of law.1
30
2. Lawyers don't always want this done
It may also be argued that when lawyers fail to integrate the law
and the facts, it is for tactical reasons which judges ought to respect.
An undue focus on the law may interfere with counsel's efforts to
have the jury decide the case on the basis of a "story" which counsel
has carefully sought to construct throughout the trial. According to
the story model of juror decision-making, jurors' decisions are deter-
mined by the narrative each juror constructs from the evidence.131 It
follows from this theory that trial counsel should use opening and
closing arguments and the order of presenting evidence to help jurors
construct a narrative that favors the attorney's case.132
129. See, eg., EDWARD J. IMWINXELRIED, CONTRAcr TAwsuITs: TRIAL SRoTEOiES
AND TEcHmQUEs 493, 499-503 (2d ed. 1989) (instructing that closing argument should
relate law to facts and show jurors that evidence establishes elements of counsel's legal
theory); THoMAs A. MAUET, FuNDAmENTALs OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 273-74, 292-93 (2d
ed. 1988) (advising that closing argument should weave facts together with corresponding
instruction, including those instructions covering elements of claims and defenses); Margo-
lis et al., supra note 11, at 349, 359, 367, 384 (1990) (indicating that federal prosecutors in
insurance fraud case used closing argument to "tie everything together for the jury" and to
explain "how each of these little pieces and information fit together and spelled 'guilt.' ");
Tanford, supra note 14, at 105 (suggesting that lawyers "should place the instructions in the
context of the facts of the case").
130. See Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 119-20 (reporting that lawyers in federal sex-
ual harassment case stressed only small number of instructions in closing argument); id. at
228 (discussing that lawyer in federal antitrust case later agreed he should have tried to
weave more of judge's charge into his closing argument); iU/ at 444, 456 (indicating that
counsel in federal trade secrets case with multiple claims delivered "fairly general" closing
arguments without attempting to link evidence to law); Reifman et al., supra note 43, at
551 ("In consulting with trial lawyers, one of us has often been faced with blank stares
when she suggested that voir dire and closing argument should educate the jurors about
the law .... [P]oints of law that neither side considers particularly advantageous may go
unmentioned.").
131. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
132. For suggestions that trial lawyers present their case in the form of a story, see, for
example, MAUET, supra note 129, at 272, 274; JANICE ScHuETz & KATHRYN H.
SNEDAKER, COMMuNIcATION AND LITIGATION: CASE STUDIES OF FAMOUS TRIALS
(1988); WILLIAM TWINING, RETHInKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 219-61
(1990); Moore, supra note 69, at 315-41. This appears to be a more effective trial approach
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Yet, it is not necessarily incompatible with the story model for a
lawyer who has sought to have the jury build a favorable narrative to
then assist the jury in translating that story into a favorable verdict. If
a juror is unable to match the story with one of the verdict options
found in the instructions, the benefits to counsel of having constructed
the story could be totally lost. Jurors may need help identifying the
evidence that supports-or defeats-the essential elements of a claim.
Otherwise, a juror who is conscientiously trying to apply the instruc-
tions may conclude reluctantly that their preferred verdict, based on
the story the juror constructed, is legally unjustified because the evi-
dence necessary to establish or defeat a key element is missing.13 3
For example, in the civil suit in which I participated, the plain-
tiff's case was built around a story, the theme of which was that a
sympathetic and enterprising inventor was taken advantage of by a
large corporate defendant that hoped to steal his ideas. It would not
have been inconsistent with this story approach for plaintiff's counsel
to have used closing argument to link the evidence to some of the
critical legal elements of plaintiff's claims. Yet counsel never speci-
fied which contract defendant had breached or what evidence estab-
lished the breach, with the result that the jury found against plaintiff
on this claim. On the cause of action for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff again failed to indicate
which contract the covenant pertained to, or what conduct by defend-
ant constituted the breach. While the jury found for plaintiff on this
claim, it took considerable effort; the jury decided that it could imply
this covenant into plaintiff's expired employment contract, and that
defendant's failure to give plaintiff adequate notice and opportunity
to clear out his laboratory area before the contents were destroyed
breached the covenant. Plaintiff's counsel took an enormous risk in
expecting the jury to figure this out on its own.134
To be sure, a lawyer who knows that some elements critical to
success are but weakly supported by the evidence will not want to
than one that is organized in terms of legal issues and arguments. Pennington & Hastie,
supra note 68, at 195, 210-12, 217.
133. See HAsrm ET AL., supra note 10, at 169 (noting that jurors's "stories. of what
happened [were] relatively resistant to persuasive argumentation from other jurors [and
that] virtually every dramatic shift in juror verdict preferences... occurred because of
changes in opinion about the law or jury procedures").
134. Several jurors later stated that had there not been a lawyer on the panel, they
would never have understood, much less ruled for the plaintiff on, the breach of implied
covenant claim.
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focus the jury's attention on those aspects of the case.135 But in such
situations, one would expect that opposing counsel would have every
incentive to point this out, in which event the jury will have some help
in linking the evidence to the law, at least on those critical points. 136
Yet, even if both parties may wish the jury to ignore the law and to
decide the case based purely on sympathy or emotion, the judge has
no duty to aid and abet such efforts. To the contrary, the court has an
independent responsibility to help assure that the jury decides the
case based on the evidence and the law.137 This can happen only if
jurors understand how the instructions are to be applied to the facts of
the case. While counsel may at times believe they will benefit from a
confused jury, it is unethical for a lawyer deliberately to sow such con-
fusion.138 Judges should not have the slightest hesitation about seek-
ing to counteract such efforts.
It might also be feared that a lawyer who uses closing argument
to tie the evidence to specific elements of the instructions may, in the
jury's eyes, appear to be relying on legal technicalities rather than on
what is right and just. It might thus seem picayune for the defense to
emphasize plaintiff's failure to offer evidence on some small but es-
sential element of a claim.139 Yet, if counsel's review of the evidence
is part of a closing argument that discusses all of the claims in issue
and that also emphasizes the equities of the client's case, it is doubtful
135. This concern is similar to the objection'lawyers sometimes raise to having the jury
use a special verdict. See Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 57.
136. This does not always happen. In the criminal case on which I sat, the jury realized
on its own that one necessary element of the false imprisonment charge was wholly unsup-
ported by the evidence; however, the jury nearly overlooked this element and was about to
convict defendant of this felony. See supra note 79. Rather than leaving the matter to
chance, the defense might have pointed out this critical defect during its closing argument.
137. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
138. Lawyers have an ethical duty not to bring a case knowing it can be won only if the
jury misunderstands the law or the evidence. See Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11,
at 87 & n.47 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSioNAL RESPONSMILITY DR 7-102 (1980)).
Rule 5-200 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer present-
ing a matter to a tribunal "[s]hall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by
an artifice or false statement of fact or law...." CAL. RULES OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDUcr
Rule 5-200 (1994); see also Klemme v. Hoag Memorial Hosp. Presbyterian, 103 Cal. App.
3d 640, 649, 163 Cal. Rptr. 109, 114 (1980) (holding that deliberate attempts by counsel to
mislead jury constitute prejudicial error); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards
3-5.8, 4-7.7 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1993) (stating that prosecutors and defense counsel shall not
intentionally mislead jury or make arguments that will divert jury from its duty to decide
case on evidence).
139. This may explain why defense counsel in the civil suit on which I sat never pointed
out to the jury that plaintiff had introduced no evidence to support a key element of its
claims for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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that the jury will be left with the impression that the attorney has been
nitpicking.
3. It will only make matters worse
A third possible objection to this proposal is that it may have the
opposite of its intended effect, and will leave juries more, rather than
less, confused. Particularly in a complex case, if counsel or the court
go through every element of every claim and summarize all of the
evidence that pertains to each, jurors will be even more bewildered. 4 '
This is a tactic sometimes employed by the defense to confuse juries,
especially in criminal cases where only a reasonable doubt need be
created in order to gain an acquittal.' 4 ' This danger can be avoided,
however, by providing a less detailed review, perhaps one confined to
stating the parties' opposing contentions as to each element of the
case. If counsel should provide a summary so detailed that the jury is
likely to be confused, the court might give its own brief summary fol-
lowing closing arguments. 142
4. Judges won't go along with it
Finally, it may be objected that the proposal advanced here is
naively unrealistic because judges are not about to adopt it. As noted
earlier, courts rarely exercise their authority to summarize the evi-
dence due to the extra work involved and the enhanced risk of rever-
sal.143 For the same reasons, a judge may be hesitant to threaten
counsel with the exercise of this authority, for if the lawyers decline
the bait, the court will have to make good on its threat. Yet neither of
these drawbacks to summarizing the evidence need deter a judge from
following the proposal advanced here.
As far as the court's workload is concerned, it may be possible for
the judge to insist that counsel prepare a summary of the evidence,
either as a stipulation on which all parties agree, or as separate sum-
maries that might serve as the basis for reaching a negotiated agree-
140. Lempert, Let's Not Rush, supra note 11, at 127 (noting that in complex cases it is
almost impossible to truly summarize evidence).
141. ImwnKELREmD, supra note 129, at 503. However, such conduct is unethical. See
supra note 138.
142. As noted earlier, there are many ways of summarizing the evidence. The approach
followed will depend on the nature and complexity of the case. The summary need not be
minute and exhaustive. It might consist of little more than a review of the parties' oppos-
ing factual contentions on each disputed element, without attempting to identify the evi-
dence used to support those contentions. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 172-73.
143. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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ment.1' 4 The court could insist that counsels' drafts be of limited
length and in a prescribed form, so as to assure that they serve the
goal of enlightening rather than confusing the jury. The summaries
would be submitted immediately at the close of the evidence, but
prior to the charging conference at which they would be discussed.
The court could use these drafts as the basis for its own summary, in
the event that it had to deliver one. Because of the assistance pro-
vided by counsel, the burden falling on the court will have been very
substantially reduced.
The risk that summarizing the evidence may lead to reversal can
also be minimized. The risk, of course, will vanish entirely if the sum-
mary is given by counsel rather than by the court. The fact that the
parties will have drafted and perhaps agreed upon a summary of the
evidence may greatly increase the instances where closing arguments
link the evidence to the law, for counsel have already done all the
work. And even if only one side agrees to provide such a summary,
opposing counsel may feel compelled to follow suit.
In those instances where it is necessary for the court to perform
this task, counsel may have agreed to the contents of the summary,
145
thereby eliminating any basis for challenging it on appeal. Even if no
such stipulation was reached, after the court delivers its summary, it
might afford counsel an opportunity to suggest any corrections or ad-
ditions, thereby giving the judge an opportunity to cure whatever er-
rors may have been made. 46 Finally, the risk of reversible error can
144. Since the court's summary of the evidence is often delivered as part of the instruc-
tions, see supra note 128, existing statutes and rules that require counsel to submit pro-
posed instructions might be construed to give judges the authority to require that counsel
also submit a proposed summary of the evidence; see, e.g., CAL. Crv. PRoc. CoDE § 607a
(West 1976). The proposed instructions and the proposed summary of the evidence would
not be submitted together, however, since the former is usually due prior to the start of
trial, see, e.g., id; C.D. CAL. LocAL R. 13.2.1, while the latter would be submitted after the
trial had concluded.
145. According to Chief Judge Weinstein,
Charges, including discussions by the judge of the legal contentions of the parties
..., should be negotiated. This requires that the judge have his own proposed
charge typed in advance of summations. It also requires, of course, that the par-
ties get their requests in early so they can be incorporated as needed. The pro-
posed charge is distributed, studied by the lawyers, and then corrected page by
page. In most cases, full discussion and compromise result in a charge everyone
can accept. If a party refuses to compromise, the record is clear and the unrea-
sonable and recalcitrant party's position at the trial and appellate level is
undercut.
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 186.
146. See Margolis et al., supra note 11, at 327 (reporting that in federal civil antitrust
action where judge's instructions included summary of parties' contentions on each point,
charge ended: "Now, if you will bear with me just a few more moments, please, you may
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be reduced still further if the court confines its summary to stating the
parties' principal contentions on each legal issue, without reviewing
the specific evidence offered to prove them. This will avoid the dan-
ger that the judge's account will be found to have been biased because
it omitted or mischaracterized a key piece of evidence.
Thus, the fact that courts in the past have been reluctant to sum-
marize the evidence for the jury need not doom the proposal offered
here. If counsel prepare draft summaries for the court, or agree upon
a summary, the burden on the court and the risk of reversal both di-
minish considerably. Perhaps this is enough of a difference that
judges will be willing to give the idea a try.
VI. CONCLUSION
If juries are to return verdicts that are based on the law, it is nec-
essary that they understand how to use the court's instructions. A
great body of research has focused on the inability of juries to com-
prehend the law. Efforts to revise jury instructions so as to make
them more intelligible are promising, if underutilized. In addition to
problems of comprehension, however, juries face a distinct and formi-
dable difficulty in not knowing what to do with the instructions. This
should come as no surprise. If beginning law students have a hard
time learning to apply the law to the facts, why should it be any easier
for jurors, whose total legal education consists of a brief lecture from
the judge? Even the most simply written instructions are of no use to
a jury that does not know what to do with them.
It is up to the court to assure that juries know how to employ the
instructions. To that end, this Essay makes two suggestions. First,
shortly before the jury retires, the judge should provide a brief in-
struction that suggests how the jurors might make better use of the
instructions as a tool in reaching a verdict. Second, courts should take
fuller advantage of their authority to summarize the evidence as a way
of encouraging counsel to link the law to the evidence during closing
argument. These proposals are made in the spirit of Francis Bacon's
advice that judges " 'be a light to the jurors to open their eyes.' "147
Without some additional illumination, our elaborate process of in-
structing the jury may amount to little more than an empty ritual.
stand and stretch, but I will need another moment to confer with counsel to see whether I
have inadvertently misstated or omitted anything.").
147. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 163 (quoting Francis Bacon).
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